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Abstract
IoT
systems
have
enabled
ubiquitous
communication in physical spaces, making them smart
Nowadays, there is an emerging concern about
evaluating suspicious transactions in smart spaces.
Suspicious transactions might have a logical structure,
but they are not correct under the present contextual
information of smart spaces. This research reviews
suspicious transactions in smart spaces and evaluates
the characteristics of blockchain technology to manage
them. Additionally, this research presents a
blockchain-based system model with the novel idea of
iContracts (interactive contracts) to enable contextual
evaluation through proof-of-provenance to detect
suspicious transactions in smart spaces.

1. Introduction
According to Zhang et al. [1], physical spaces
become smart when its technological elements can
communicate between them and with the Internet to
enhance the physical features of that particular space
and satisfy the requirements of multiple users (Internet
of Things multitenancy [2]).
Smart spaces rely on pervasive Internet of Things
(IoT) systems [3][4] to get data from the environment
and provide accurate services [5]. The more
pervasiveness, the more autonomous smart spaces
become and the more personalized services multiple
users receive [6]. According to Zhang et al. [1], IoT
systems that govern smart spaces “must be contextaware so that they can adapt to rapidly changing
conditions.” However, most of the IoT systems do not
evaluate contextual information before executing
transactions, which makes IoT networks vulnerable to
attacks, — for instance, the implantable cardiac
devices from St. Jude Hospital that were hacked [7].
This research evaluates the characteristics of
blockchain technology to handle the emerging concern
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of evaluating suspicious transactions in smart spaces.
Additionally, this research presents a system model to
help to identify suspicious transactions in smart spaces
by evaluating contextual information and proof of
provenance. This system model introduces iContracts
(interactive contracts).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents smart spaces, their architectures and
security concerns. Section 3 introduces suspicious
transactions in smart spaces. Section 4 introduces
blockchain for smart spaces. Section 5 explains the
proposed system model. Section 6 presents preliminary
evaluations. Finally, section 7 presents conclusions and
future work.

2. Smart Spaces
According to Baladin and Waris [8], smart spaces
are common spaces that have capabilities to get data
from the environment and apply knowledge to fulfill
requirements of mobility, distribution and context
awareness of its inhabitants, without them to be
required to do any particular task.
The advent of Internet of Things (IoT) technology
has allowed the development of ubiquitous smart
spaces [9][10], which include devices with
heterogeneous computing capabilities [11], processing
power, memory and communication protocols to
satisfy those requirements.
The design of smart spaces is dictated by their
mission, location and specific requirements for
inhabitants [8]. Traditionally, architectures for IoT
smart spaces integrate the Cloud as the provider of
virtually unlimited computing resources to process the
vast amounts of sensed data and manage the connected
devices to satisfy a possible scaling demand [12][13].
This architecture is mostly used in healthcare; for
instance, Doukas et al. [14] combine IoT and Cloud
computing to manage wearable sensors. Also, Tyagi et
al. [15] present and IoT-cloud framework to manage
the transferal of patients’ health information. Cloudbased smart spaces have to deal with security, latency
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and traffic caused by the communication, data
processing, and access control management of the
volume and velocity of data obtained from different
geographical locations [13][16][17]. Sometimes,
cloud-based smart spaces lack of security at the
constrained level of sensors and actuators. This issue is
mainly because cloud-based systems do not interact
with IoT networks directly but through a middleware
[12]. This lack of security at the constrained level is the
perfect opportunity for hackers to penetrate our smart
spaces (e.g., [7][18][19][20]).
Researchers have presented an alternative
architecture to interact with IoT networks directly,
which switch the focus to devices [21]. This
architecture focuses on the enhancement of sensors and
actuators, providing computing resources closer to
them. This approach lowers latency and traffic in
communication, data processing, and access control
management — for instance, enchanted objects
customized for specific users [22]. Things-centric
smart spaces have to deal with emerging security
issues regarding communication, data processing, and
access control management at the constrained level
where services directly access physical devices [16].

For instance, multitenancy and edge processing
[23][2][24].

3. Suspicious Transactions in IoT Smart
Spaces
Based on the generally accepted architecture of IoT
networks [25][22], suspicious transactions can be
studied from two perspectives, cloud-centric and
things-centric.
The cloud-centric [25] perspective focuses on
analyzing communication, data processing, and access
control management transactions from services hosted
on the Cloud.
The things-centric [22] perspective focuses on
analyzing communication, data processing, and access
control management transactions in the constrained
network and edges. Things-centric suspicious
transactions might affect the correct functionality of
sensors and actuators, and edge devices that work as
bridges.
Table 1 presents a comparative analysis of
suspicious transactions in the Cloud and constrained
networks.

Table 1: Comparative Analysis of Suspicious Transactions in Smart Spaces
Cloud-Centric
Communication

-

Data Processing
Access Control
Management
-

Things-Centric

Execution of not registered
communication protocols
High latency when processing
sensed data on Internet services

-

Failure of Internet services
authentication
No authentication or a global
authentication requirement for third
parties reading sensed data
Distribution of incorrect views for
users
Execution of unauthorized online
financial transactions

-

In any case, suspicious transactions have to be detected
and stopped to avoid compromising the integrity of our
smart spaces. According to Lee et al. [26], the
contextual scenario in which smart spaces work and
data is processed is an emerging security concern.

-

-

Delayed data streaming from sensors and edge
devices
High latency when processing sensed data on
edge services hosted at the edge of sensors (e.g.
raspberry pi)
Failure of sensors or actuators authentication
Not authentication or a global authentication
requirement for third parties executing
firmware updates
Distribution of incorrect firmware to devices.
Execution of unauthorized operations among
actuators

Additionally, Perera et al. [27] explain that smart
spaces should consider surrounding contextual
information to guarantee security in rapidly-changing
environments. Conceptual and physical conditions can
drive this change. The current contextual details of a
smart space can determine whether or not a transaction
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should be considered as suspicious [28][29].
Contextual parameters might include real-time
environment data, history data, rules, among others,
depending on the application field of the smart space.
The following are examples of context-aware IoT
systems. Smailagic and Kogan [30] present a location
context-aware IoT environment for location sensing,
which uses less power and achieves secure privacy.
Additionally, Al-Muhtadi et al. [31] present a security
scheme that implements a context-aware infrastructure
to manage the identification of users and access control
to physical resources.

4. Blockchain & Smart Spaces
Autonomy and personalization of smart spaces
come to the price of giving private data to centralized
systems.
Smart
spaces
commonly
manage
communication, data processing, and access to data
through centralized architectures in the cloud. While
this approach provides high consistency (CAP theorem
[32]), it introduces a security concern as all data and
access to data is managed by a unique central
authority.
Researchers
have
integrated
blockchain
technologies in smart spaces [3][4] to avoid
centralization of data. Thus, communication, data
processing, and access control management are
executed in a distributed approach with high security,
reliability, and immutability by blockchain smart
contracts without granting all decision power to a
single authority [33][34][35].
Even though the immutability of blockchain smart
contracts introduces high security and reliability, they
might represent a downside when considering security
concerns related to rapidly changing contextual
information [29][36][37]. Blockchain-based systems
have been implemented mostly to manage access
control management through smart contracts
[38][39][40]. There is still research to do to evaluate
blockchain working on rapidly changing environments
like smart spaces. It is necessary to build blockchainbased systems that integrate software components to
manage rapidly changing contextual information
[41][42]. These types of systems would be especially
useful nowadays that we are surrounded by IoT
devices whose security proxy relies on single keys and
passwords. Sometimes, we detect intrusions when it

has passed a long time, and our smart space has been
compromised.
This research proposes a model that supports
blockchain systems by enabling context-awareness and
flexibility to detect suspicious transactions under
changing contextual information in smart spaces.

5. Proposed System Model
We propose a system model that integrates
blockchain technology to provide decentralization,
high security and reliability of transactions.
Additionally, our system model integrates external
components to deal with rapidly changing contextual
information. We call these external components
iContracts (interactive contracts). Unlike traditional
blockchain smart contracts, iContracts can be updated
at any time, which enables high flexibility that
blockchain technologies do not have.
The proposed system model has three components,
a private blockchain system to mine transactions,
iContracts to evaluate contextual information, and a
Transaction Executor to execute transactions over IoT
devices. iContracts and Transaction Executor have
been designed as REST services, each of them with
different URI’s as the unique ID. iContracts read
information from the private blockchain system
through REST microservices implemented with HTTP
protocol. iContracts and the Transaction Executor
communicate between them through REST APIs
implemented with CoAP protocol [43]. The
programming
language
to
develop
REST
microservices, iContracts and Transaction Executor is
GoLang [44].

5.1. Blockchain System
The blockchain system is the main entry point of
the model; it mines all received transactions and passes
them to iContracts. The blockchain system is
configured as a consortium network to mine
transactions through a proof-of-work mechanism. Even
though the blockchain network is not public, we
consider that the proof-of-work mechanism is
necessary to allow the participation of external miners.
The blockchain system exposes reading and writing
operation through REST API’s.
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Figure 1. The general architecture of the proposed system model.

5.2. iContracts (Interactive Contracts)
iContracts have three levels of abstractions,
iContracts factory, iContracts evaluators, and
iContracts verifiers. iContracts factory build the
contextual information, which is represented by the
provenance of transactions of IoT devices read from
the blockchain and by the surrounding data got by
sensors. iContracts factory builds the skeleton that will
allow iContracts evaluators to determine possible
suspicious transactions. iContracts factory has the
following components:
• Internal URL to receive transactions from the
blockchain system, and to interact with other
iContracts.
• Conceptual information, the provenance of
transactions obtained from the blockchain system.
• Physical Information, surrounding environment
data obtained from sensors (e.g. date, temperature,
location, among others).
iContracts evaluators encapsulate a set of rules and
policies designed as REST services to evaluate
contextual information (conceptual and physical

information about transactions and IoT devices,
respectively) received from iContracts factory. Rules
are implemented in the form of If-Else structures, and
policies are implemented in the form of triggered
actions. If an iContract evaluator detects that a
transaction is trying to be executed under and old
contextual template or a completely different one, they
will consider those transactions as suspicious and stop
them. iContracts evaluators mark transactions as
suspicious or approved. Approved transactions are sent
to the Transaction Executor, and suspicious
transactions are sent to iContracts verifiers. iContracts
evaluators have the following components:
• Internal URL to receive contextual information
from iContracts factory and interact with other
iContracts.
• Context-awareness Code, rules/conditions/policies
to evaluate contextual information.
iContracts verifiers encapsulate a 2-phase
verification process which requires the revoke/approval
of users from a trusted device (push notification). All
suspicious transactions will be stopped until receiving
the commit from the user. iContracts will change the
state of suspicious transactions that were accepted by
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the user to approved and will pass them to the IoT
transaction executor. Rejected transactions will be part
of the provenance information and will be included in
the next round of received mined transactions in
iContracts factory.
iContracts can be updated to fulfill the new
contextual validation requirements of users. The
update of iContracts must be executed by trusted nodes
and additionally requires an extra 2-phase commit
validation.

updating of the configuration to perform those reading
operations.

Figure 2. Intel Edison System on a Chip plugged on an
Arduino Board [47]

5.3. Transaction Executor
Table 3. Specifications of Edison SoC [47]
The transaction executor is the component that
finally executes transactions onto physical IoT devices.
Only mined transactions that have passed the
validation process from iContracts will reach this
component. This approach decreases internal latency,
which introduces a better performance compared to
Cloud-centric IoT [45].

Edison System on a Chip
Operating
System
CPU
RAM

Linux Yocto
500 MHz dual-core, dual threaded Intel Atom
and a 100 MHz 32-bit Intel Quark
microcontroller
4GB LPDDR2 SDRAM

6. Preliminary Evaluations
Preliminary evaluations were performed to measure
the performance of the two components that support
contextual evaluation in smart spaces, iContracts
(factory and evaluators). iContracts verifiers could not
be evaluated as they depend on the commit action from
users. Table 2 presents the characteristic of the nodes
that run the iContracts.
We used Ethereum [46] to implement the private
blockchain network. Table 2 presents the characteristic
of the nodes that run the Ethereum network.
Table 2. Specification of the nodes that run the
Ethereum blockchain network and execute iContracts
Hardware
Operating System
CPU
RAM

Details
Linux Debian 9.8
Intel(R) Core (TM) i7-6700 CPU @
3.40GHz
16 GB

We emulated IoT temperature sensors as Golang
routines deployed on Edison Arduino boards (figure 2).
Table 3 shows the specifications of the hardware. We
emulated provenance of transactions (everyday
transactions) that includes only reading transactions
over IoT devices. The reading operations involve
sensing the current temperature in Celsius, and the
updated configuration is intended to change it to
Fahrenheit. The new transaction to be executed is the

To have information for the iContract factory to
build the contextual scenario, we sent 100 reading
transactions. After that, we sent the suspicious
transaction (configuration updating) randomly. As
soon as the proof of provenance of the iContract
evaluator detects a transaction that has not been
executed before, they mark the transaction as
suspicious and send it to get the user approval or
rejection.
Figures 3 to 5 show the performance of the
iContract factory while collecting the contextual
information under different delays of transaction
requests (50, 100, and 200 milliseconds). The
contextual information includes the provenance
information of the 100 transactions divided into groups
of 10 and current date time as the physical information.
In the graphs, the x-axis represents every provenance
input group, and the y-axis represents the time it takes
to the iContract factory to build all the contextual
information. The figure shows that it takes around 2
seconds to collect the conceptual and physical
contextual information. This performance result is
directly linked to the number of previously sent
transactions (100). It is necessary to perform more
experiments to determine if the size of the provenance
data affects the performance of the iContract factory.
The delay in requesting transactions does not affect
the performance of the context factory.
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Figure 6. Performance of iContract evaluator reading
contextual information. 50 milliseconds delay.
Figure 3. Performance of the iContract factory. 50
milliseconds delay.

Figure 7. Performance of iContract evaluator reading
contextual information. 100 milliseconds delay.

Figure 4. Performance of the iContract factory. 100
milliseconds delay.

Figure 8. Performance of iContract evaluator reading
contextual information. 200 milliseconds delay.

Figure 5. Performance of the iContract factory. 200
milliseconds delay.

Figures 6 to 8 show the performance of the
iContract evaluator reading contextual information
received from the iContract factory. The results show
that in all three scenarios, the response pattern is
similar. The iContract evaluator take less than one
millisecond to read each contextual input. In average it
takes 0.33 milliseconds in all three scenarios. The
response times are that low because the iContract
evaluator reads every contextual data individually.

Figures 9 to 11 show the performance of the
iContract evaluator analyzing contextual information;
this is comparing the provenance and physical data of
all 100 contextual inputs. The graph shows that it takes
less than 1 second to execute rules and policies
contained in the iContract evaluator for each contextual
data. This response is because the iContract evaluator
works locally. The graphs show some picks. This is
because the suspicious transaction is sent randomly,
and every time it is detected; then the 2-phase context
verification is activated.
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initial state of the integration of context-aware systems
to evaluate suspicious transactions in smart spaces, we
have considered that this preliminary evaluation would
allow us to get a general vision about how our
proposed system behaves in a basic environment.
However, more details about contextual information
and evaluations will be presented in subsequent
research work that integrates extensive experiments
environments.
Figure 9. Performance of the iContract evaluator analyzing
contextual information. 50 milliseconds delay.

Figure 10. Performance of the iContract evaluator analyzing
contextual information. 100 milliseconds delay.

7. Conclusions and Future Work
This research presents the novel idea of designing a
system model to detect suspicious transactions in smart
spaces. This model introduces iContracts (interactive
contracts), which are software components that
encapsulate information of IoT devices, the provenance
of executed transactions, rules and policies to evaluate
contextual information and suspicious transactions.
The proposed system model combines blockchain
technology with iContracts to enhance security at the
constrained level and handle the rapid changing
contextual information of smart spaces.
Results of presented experiments may vary due to
differences in IoT devices, programming languages,
communication protocols, or definitions of different
rules/policies in iContracts. As future work, more
experiments will be performed to evaluate smart spaces
facing different contextual information and working on
large test environments.
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